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IMPLICATIONS OF REAL-TIME CELL PHONE 
TRACKING 
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ABSTRACT 
With the help of technological advancements, law enforcement can now hijack a 
targeted individual’s cell phone to ping and track the phone’s exact location, in real 
time. Based upon previous rulings, this new tracking process has apparently fallen 
into a “grey area” of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. However, real-time cell 
phone tracking should be a search in terms of the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, 
require a warrant. Real-time cell phone tracking infringes on an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy, violates the trespass doctrine as a trespass to 
chattels, and violates the Kyllo standard by using technology not in general public 
use to intrude into a constitutionally protected area. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Cell phones are everywhere. As a matter of fact, 90% of American adults own a 
cell phone.1 The incredible technological advancements that have occurred over the 
past two decades have allowed cell phones to essentially evolve into handheld 
computers.2 These modern cell phones, also known as smart phones, are capable of 
internet access and have the ability to use almost an infinite amount of applications, 
ranging from music playing to picture sharing, to real-time driving directions, to 
match-making for dating purposes.3 It is universally accepted that the advancement 
in cell phone technology has greatly benefited society for communication, 
entertainment, and business purposes, among countless others; however, this 
advancement in cell phone technology has inadvertently enabled a very real threat to 
the privacy of every individual who owns and uses a cell phone.4 
Law enforcement officers can access the location information that is created both 
by the ongoing communication between cell phones and cell phone towers and by 
the GPS technology installed in most cell phones.5 As a consequence, law 
enforcement can utilize this information to track the location of a specific cell phone 
or the individual carrying the phone. Furthermore, this tracking can now be done in 
real time, thereby converting a person’s cell phone into a police-operated tracking 
device.6  
                                                
 1 Mobile Technology Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CTR., 
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/mobile-technology-fact-sheet/ (last updated Oct. 
2014). 
 2 See generally The 10 Most Popular Apps of 2015, TIME (Dec. 21, 2015), 
http://time.com/4156902/most-popular-apps-2015/; Chris Nickson, Advances in Mobile 
Phones, A TECHNOLOGY SOCIETY (Dec. 1, 2015), 
http://www.atechnologysociety.co.uk/advances-mobile-phones.html; Lisa Eadicicco & Matt 
Petronzio, The 10 Most Popular Smartphone Apps in the U.S., MASHABLE (Apr. 3, 2014), 
http://mashable.com/2014/04/03/popular-apps-chart/#ExK1AJ_7.iqj; 5 Major Moments in 
Cellphone History, CBC NEWS (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/5-major-
moments-in-cellphone-history-1.1407352; Nick Wingfield, Despite a Slowdown, Smartphone 
Advancements Are Still Ahead, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/technology/despite-a-slowdown-smartphone-advances-
are-still-ahead.html?_r=0; Justin Meyers, Watch the Incredible 70-Year Evolution of the Cell 
Phone, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 6, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/complete-visual-
history-of-cell-phones-2011-5. 
 3 Nickson, supra note 2.  
 4 Id. 
 5 See generally United States v. Lambis, No. 15cr734, 2016 WL 3870940, 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 90085 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2016); United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759 
(E.D. Mich. 2013). 
 6 As opposed to historical cell phone location information which allows police to 
retroactively look at a cell phone’s location, determining where a cell phone has been, not 
where it currently is. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 772. 
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Real-time cell phone tracking is a highly invasive procedure; it can be conducted 
without cell phone users having a scintilla of notice that law enforcement is steadily 
and constantly monitoring their location.7 People clearly do not buy phones 
expecting that the government will monitor their every movement with pinpoint 
precision.8 Real-time cell phone tracking is a type of government activity that, 
although perhaps conducted with good intentions, is far too invasive to be allowed 
without Fourth Amendment protections.  
Currently, there is no bright-line rule regarding the constitutionality of real-time 
tracking of cell phone location information.9 Some courts have held that real-time 
cell phone tracking does not implicate the Fourth Amendment and, thus, allow law 
enforcement officers to access cell phone location information without a warrant 
supported by probable cause.10 Other courts have held that law enforcement’s real-
time tracking of individuals’ cell phones does implicate the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure.11 The lack of clarity on this 
issue has given police and law enforcement the ability to both vastly abuse their 
powers and track the movements of any individual through his or her cell phone.12 
This Note argues that courts should automatically consider the real-time tracking 
of cell phone location information as a search under the Fourth Amendment because 
it violates a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy, constitutes a trespass that 
activates the trespass doctrine, and relies on technology not available to the general 
public in conducting a search. Part II of this Note addresses the evolution of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence in terms of searches. Part III of this Note describes the 
technological background of modern cell phone location tracking capabilities and 
provides the background that is essential to understanding the issue of real-time cell 
phone tracking. Part IV of this Note briefly introduces how courts have previously 
addressed the issue of cell phone location tracking. Part V develops the position that 
real-time cell phone location tracking implicates the Fourth Amendment. This 
section compares and distinguishes a widely cited Sixth Circuit case that holds real-
time cell phone tracking is not a Fourth Amendment search and synthesizes the issue 
of real-time cell phone tracking with the seminal Fourth Amendment search cases 
addressed in the background. Part V also explains why, as a bright-line rule, real-
time cell phone tracking should be considered a Fourth Amendment search.    
                                                
 7 See Matthew Devoy Jones, The “Orwellian Consequence” of Smartphone Tracking: 
Why a Warrant Under the Fourth Amendment is Required Prior to Collection of GPS Data 
from Smartphones, 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 211, 222-23 (2014). 
 8 See State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 632 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2013). 
 9 See Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759. Contra United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th 
Cir. 2012). 
 10 See Skinner, 690 F.3d at 777. 
 11 See Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 767; see also United States v. Lambis, No. 15cr734, 
2016 WL 3870940, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90085 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2016). 
 12 See Jones, supra note 7, at 222-23.  
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II. SEARCHES—A BRIEF HISTORY OF FOURTH AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
An examination of the text of the Fourth Amendment and the case law that 
shaped its jurisprudence will provide valuable insight into developing an 
understanding of the constitutionally based argument that real-time cell phone 
tracking should be considered a search.  The Fourth Amendment protects the 
American people by providing as follows:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.13 
 This section focuses on the first clause of the Fourth Amendment and addresses 
the issue of what constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.14 The principles 
that are established and progressed in this section are imperative in guiding the 
Fourth Amendment’s application to the issue of real-time cell phone tracking. 
A. Fourth Amendment Fossils—The Pre-History of Olmstead 
 The American founding fathers had significant experience dealing with the 
unbridled power of the British government during colonial America.15 Accordingly, 
the founders drafted the Fourth Amendment with the goal of protecting the privacy 
rights of the individual through the establishment of the right to be secure against the 
government’s unreasonable searches and seizures.16 Historically, when determining 
whether a government action constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment, 
courts utilized a property trespass theory.17 
In Olmstead v. United States, the Court considered, for the first time, the 
implications of technology on Fourth Amendment searches.18 The Olmstead Court 
                                                
 13 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 14 The second clause of the Fourth Amendment is of equal importance but will not be 
addressed in this Note. Essentially, if a government action has been determined to be a search, 
in terms of the Fourth Amendment, the government must procure a warrant supported by 
probable cause before conducting the search. If the government fails to procure a warrant for a 
Fourth Amendment search, its actions are unconstitutional, and the fruits of the 
unconstitutional search will likely be excluded. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 
(1976); see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1963) (discussing the 
exclusionary rule). 
 15 In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a 
Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 537 (D. Md. 2011). 
 16 See id. 
 17 Id.; see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457 (1928).  
 18 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455-57; see also R. Craig Curtis et al., Using Technology the 
Founders Never Dreamed of: Cell Phones as Tracking Devices and the Fourth Amendment, 4 
U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 61, 65 (2014). In Olmstead, government agents investigating a large 
scale bootlegging operation tapped the telephone lines connecting to the main office of the 
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held that a Fourth Amendment search had not been effectuated because the 
government did not engage in a physical trespass.19 The Olmstead Court’s reliance 
on the trespass doctrine “placed the core value of Fourth Amendment protection on 
constitutionally protected places,”20 and the holding essentially confined the Fourth 
Amendment to searches and seizures of tangible property.21 The trespass doctrine 
would remain at the forefront of search and seizure analysis, under the Fourth 
Amendment, for the next forty years until the Supreme Court’s decision in Katz v. 
United States.22 
B. Katz and Beyond—Establishing a Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Katz created a new doctrine that would provide 
the basis for almost all subsequent Fourth Amendment search analyses and underlies 
the argument that real-time cell phone tracking should implicate the Fourth 
Amendment. Katz addressed the legality of the government’s conduct in recording 
telephone calls that private individuals made from a public telephone booth.23 Katz 
maintained that the reach of the Fourth Amendment cannot hinge on whether a 
physical intrusion occurred and that the trespass doctrine utilized in Olmstead no 
longer controls Fourth Amendment search and seizure analysis.24 Furthermore, the 
Court held that “the Government’s activities in electronically listening to and 
recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied 
. . . and thus constituted a search . . . within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.”25  
Justice Harlan, in expanding upon the majority’s holding in his concurring 
opinion, reasoned that there was a “twofold test” to determine whether a search or 
seizure is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment: “first that a person have 
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and second, that the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”26 Justice 
                                                
operation as well as several home telephone lines, all without a warrant. The wiretaps were 
inserted without any physical trespass onto private property. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455-57.  
 19 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464-65 (comparing a government agent’s intercepting and 
opening of a sealed letter sent in the mail, a clear search of the sender’s papers and effects, to 
the wiretapping of a phone line which is no more a part of a person’s house than the highways 
on which their house is located).  
 20 Curtis et al., supra note 18, at 65.   
 21 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967); see also Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464-
66 (establishing that the Amendment itself is confined to the application only of tangible 
things – persons, places, papers and effects). 
 22 Curtis et al., supra note 18, at 66. 
 23 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348-49. 
 24 Id. at 353. “The premise that property interests control the right of the Government to 
search and seize has been discredited.” Id. at 371 (quoting Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. 
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)). 
 25 Id. at 353. 
 26 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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Harlan further elaborated that an “intrusion” into a constitutionally protected area 
itself will not be sufficient to equate to a Fourth Amendment search if the person in 
ownership of the constitutionally protected area does not have a subjective, 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the area.27 Both the majority opinion and Justice 
Harlan’s concurrence acted to effectively replace the trespass doctrine and the 
dispositive test on Fourth Amendment searches.28 Justice Harlan’s twofold test 
would serve as the basis of analysis for subsequent seminal cases addressing Fourth 
Amendment search issues.29 
After Katz, the Supreme Court addressed issues of tracking surveillance via 
technology and their implications on the subjective, reasonable expectation of 
privacy test in United States v. Knotts, United States v. Karo, and United States v. 
Jones.30  In Knotts, the Supreme Court established that an individual has no 
reasonable and subjective expectation of privacy in his or her movements on public 
roads and highways.31 Knotts created a limitation on the extent of a person’s 
subjective expectation of privacy.32 The Court examined whether a Fourth 
Amendment search had been effectuated when petitioner purchased a five-gallon 
drum of chloroform to which the police attached a tracking device to the drum 
before the purchase.33 Government agents tracked the drum in two separate vehicles 
(after the drum was transferred between the two), using visual surveillance that was 
supplemented and augmented by the electronic beeper signals, to respondent Knotts’ 
cabin. 34 Furthermore, the Court saw no indication that the police used the beeper to 
monitor the location of the drum once it was inside Knotts’ cabin or in any way that 
would not have been observable and in the plain view of the cabin from outside. 35 
The Court followed the Katz test and held that the monitoring of the beeper signals 
did not violate any “legitimate expectation of privacy” because the surveillance of 
                                                
 27 Id. (“Thus a man’s home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but 
objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not 
‘protected’ because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the other 
hand, conversations in the open would not be protected against being overhead, for the 
expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable.”); see also Silverman 
v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (“At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] 
stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable 
governmental intrusion.”). 
 28 Curtis et al., supra note 18, at 66. 
 29 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
 30 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 
(1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); Curtis et al., supra note 18, at 67-68; 
Jones, supra note 7, at 218. 
 31 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281. 
 32 Id. at 276. This limitation is applicable but distinguishable in support of the main 
argument of this article. See infra Part V.B. 
 33 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277. 
 34 Id. at 278. 
 35 Id. at 285. 
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the transportation of the drum was an operation that the police could have carried out 
entirely through visual surveillance.36 
In Karo, the facts were virtually identical to Knotts, except that the police 
installed the beeper tracking device on a can of ether that had already been 
purchased by respondents, and that the beeper tracked the movements of the can 
inside the residences of the respondents.37 Here, the Court held that when electronic 
surveillance provides a government agent with information about the inside of a 
private residence that would not be available through plain view from beyond the 
curtilage of the residence, the government engages in a Fourth Amendment search.38  
The Karo Court reasoned that “indiscriminate monitoring of property that has 
been withdrawn from public view would present far too serious a threat to privacy 
interests in the home” and, therefore, should be monitored and checked under the 
Fourth Amendment.39 When considered together, Knotts and Karo provide that 
“government may use technology that enhances the senses to improve their ability to 
conduct surveillance in public areas without any restrictions, but to use such 
technology to search a private space, such as a home,” would qualify as a Fourth 
Amendment search and necessitate the procurement of a warrant based on probable 
cause.40 Then, following Knotts and Karo and their utilizations of the Katz test, the 
Supreme Court decided to revisit the age-old trespass doctrine in its decision of 
United States v. Jones.41 
In Jones, the Supreme Court chose to rely on the trespass doctrine in lieu of the 
Katz test. On its face, it would appear that a reliance on the trespass doctrine would 
weaken the case for the inclusion of real-time cell phone tracking into the category 
of searches requiring Fourth Amendment protection; however, analyzing real-time 
cell phone tracking as a trespass to chattels supports the position adopted by this 
Note.42 Jones considered whether the long-term tracking of an individual by a GPS 
tracking device attached to the undercarriage of a vehicle was a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.43 A focal point of the legal analysis was the extensive length 
and comprehensiveness of tracking that the government agents conducted on Jones.44 
                                                
 36 Id. at 282-85; see also id. at 282 (“Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the 
police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such 
enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this case.”); see also id. at 283 
(quoting United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) (comparing beeper technology to 
supplement and augment visual surveillance to the use of a searchlight)). 
 37 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984), 708-09 (noting that the beeper also tracked 
the package within a locked storage locker). 
 38 Id. at 715 (“Even if visual surveillance has revealed that the article to which the beeper 
is attached has entered the house, the later monitoring not only verifies the officers’ 
observations but also establishes that the article remains on the premises.”). 
 39 Id. at 716. 
 40 Curtis et al., supra note 18, at 68. 
 41 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 42 See infra Section V.C. 
 43 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012). 
 44 Id. at 964. 
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The search included twenty-eight days of tracking, consisting of 2,000 pages of data 
over a four-week period.45 However, the majority never addressed whether the 
length and comprehensiveness of the surveillance equated to a violation of Jones’ 
reasonable, subjective expectation of privacy because it found that the government 
conducted a Fourth Amendment search when police trespassed upon Jones’ property 
interests.46 Jones found that the government’s actions constituted a physical intrusion 
of property for the purpose of obtaining information and, therefore, was a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.47  
The Jones majority’s reliance on the trespass doctrine did not replace the 
twofold, subjective and reasonable expectation of privacy test formulated in Katz; 
rather, it supplemented the Katz test and provided another prong of analysis.48 This 
new approach, incorporating both Katz and Jones, is the test that courts now apply to 
modern Fourth Amendment issues.49 
III. TECHNOLOGICAL BACKGROUND—EXPLAINING CELLULAR DATA 
TRACKING 
A. Cell Site Location Data 
A basic understanding of modern cell phone tracking technology and procedures 
is necessary to properly appreciate the analysis and conclusion of this Note, as well 
as the overall connection between the Fourth Amendment and real-time cell phone 
tracking. Cell phones operate through constant connection and communication with 
cell towers operated by respective cell phone service providers.50 As a cell phone 
moves in location, it continually reaches out to connect with the nearest cell phone 
tower, providing for a seamless transition in network connection.51 When a cell 
phone connects with a cell tower, it transmits its identifying data, unique to the 
phone itself, to the cell tower.52 The movements of a cell phone and its simultaneous 
                                                
 45 Id. at 948. 
 46 Id. at 979 (“The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of 
obtaining information. We have no doubt that such physical intrusion would have been 
considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”). 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 950; see also id. at 951 (“As Justice Brennan explained in his concurrence in 
Knotts, Katz did not erode the principle ‘that, when the Government does engage in physical 
intrusion of a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion may 
constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.’ . . . Katz did not narrow the Fourth 
Amendment’s scope.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 49 Justice Antonin Scalia was the primary force behind the resurgence of the trespass 
doctrine in Jones, so with his death and impending replacement, the Court could once again 
abandon the trespass doctrine as a basis to Fourth Amendment search analysis. 
 50 In re Application of U.S. for an Order for Disclosure of Telecomms. Records, 405 F. 
Supp. 2d 435, 436-37 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 51 Id. at 437. 
 52 Timothy Stapleton, Note, The Electronic Communications Privacy Act and Cell 
Location Data: Is the Whole More Than the Sum of Its Parts?, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 383, 387 
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connections and data transmission with various cell towers make it possible to 
calculate a cell phone’s location within a range of several blocks to several feet 
through a process called multilateration.53 Additionally, cell phone service providers 
routinely generate “call detail records” that contain accurate location information 
relating to the location of a specific cell phone as it moves throughout the course of 
its usage.54 The information that is conveyed to cell towers, known as cell site 
location information (CSLI), is vital to the understanding of cell phone tracking, and 
forms part of the baseline of the cell phone location data that is at the heart of this 
Note.55 
B. GPS Location Data 
In addition to the CSLI that is gathered through the multilateration process, GPS 
data created by the GPS locators installed in the majority of smart phones provide 
another source of location tracking.56 The GPS, or Global Positioning System, “is a 
space-based radionavigation utility owned and operated by the United States that 
provides highly-accurate positioning, navigation, and timing services to any device 
equipped with a GPS receiver.”57 GPS technology can provide location information 
capable of achieving accuracy up to several feet and usually not worse than thirty-
three feet.58 Furthermore, GPS data is generally superior in precision and can be 
provided without the complicated multilateration process required in typical CSLI 
data.59  
C. Collecting Location Data 
Law enforcement, in its attempts to track the location of cell phones (and their 
users), have the option of engaging in either retroactive or prospective tracking.60 
                                                
(2007). A cell phone’s identification data consists of the ten-digit phone number and a thirty-
two-digit number that is unique to each individual cell phone. Id. 
 53 See id.; United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759, 767 n.2 (E.D. Mich. 2013) 
(stating that multilateration “is often referred to as ‘triangulation,’ but because the process 
may involve more or fewer than three cell towers, ‘multilateration’ is a more accurate term”). 
Multilateration is the process of comparing the cell phone’s signals to and from multiple cell 
towers to determine the cell phone’s precise location. Id. at 767. 
 54 In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 833 (S.D. 
Tex. 2010). 
 55 See United States v. Lambis, No. 15cr734, 2016 WL 3870940, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
90085, *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2016) (explaining that CSLI is location information derived 
from pings between cell sites and target cell phones); In re Application for Tel. Info. Needed 
for Crim. Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 56 Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 767; see also In re Application of U.S. Authorizing 
Disclosure of Location Info. of a Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 533 (D. Md. 
2011). 
 57 In re Application of U.S. Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info., 849 F. Supp. 2d at 
533. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 767. 
 60 Id. 
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Law enforcement officers can gather cell phone location information retroactively by 
recovering historical CSLI, previously created and collected CSLI data that provides 
information on where a specific cell phone was at a past date and time.61 Law 
enforcement officers can also speed up the tracking process by pinging the target cell 
phone and engaging in prospective, real-time tracking.62 This Note focuses entirely 
on the latter. 
Pinging is understood to be the process of electronically signaling a specific cell 
phone,63 which in turn triggers a responsive identification transmission from the 
targeted cell phone.64 Law enforcement will ping a cell phone with the intention of 
generating a record65 that will provide law enforcement officers with the location of 
the phone either by accessing the device’s GPS coordinates66 or artificially causing 
the phone to signal the nearest cell tower(s), initiating the multilateration process and 
triggering a responsive transmission containing the cell phone’s location.67  
Real-time tracking through cell phone pinging is virtually undetectable to the 
phone owner and, as surveillance goes, is as clandestine as possible.68 GPS and CSLI 
tracking through cell phone pinging allows law enforcement agents to collect 
“continuous, detailed, and . . . real-time location information” for “hours, days, 
weeks, months and even years” without an iota of indication to the phone owner.69 It 
is imperative to note that this high level of intensely detailed tracking allows law 
enforcement to track not only the specific cell phone, but also the individual who is 
in possession of the phone. It is as though every individual who carries a cell phone 
also carries a homing beacon, continuously broadcasting his or her location to law 
enforcement. 
IV. MODERN CASE LAW: THE MERGING OF CELL PHONE LOCATION 
DATA COLLECTION AND FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
As the usage of cell phones skyrocketed in relation to the smart phone boom in 
the mid-2000s, law enforcement officers began to take advantage of this new, 
                                                
 61 See id. at 769-70. 
 62 Id. at 767. 
 63 Pinging can also mean the periodical registration with nearby cell towers that the cell 
phone does on its own but for the sake of clarity this meaning will not be utilized or 
considered throughout this note. See In re Application for Tel. Info. Needed for Crim. 
Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1014 (N.D. Cal. 2015).  
 64 Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 767. 
 65 Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of 
Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 704 (2011). 
 66 See In re Application of U.S. Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a Specified 
Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 533 (D. Md. 2011). 
 67 Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 767. 
 68 In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a 
Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d at 534. 
 69 Lenese C. Herbert, Challenging the (Un)constitutionality of Governmental GPS 
Surveillance, 26 CRIM. JUST. 34, 34 (2011). 
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widespread resource to locate targets of investigations.70 As a result of this new 
technology, legal issues relating to the access of cell phone location data began to 
come to light. In cases where the courts have determined the Fourth Amendment has 
been implicated, the relevant and overarching issue has been whether the 
government’s collection of cell phone location data constituted a privacy intrusion.71 
In the subsequent paragraphs, the cases form the foundation of the issue of cell 
phone tracking and are instances where the courts either did not extend their analysis 
all the way into the Fourth Amendment or where the utilized method of cell phone 
tracking was not real time.  
The subsequent cases provide valuable insight into the legal treatment of 
searches and tracking via cell phone technology, although they do not directly apply 
to the real-time cell phone tracking Fourth Amendment analysis. One such case 
distinguishes historical cell site location information from information that police 
would recover by the use of a pen register under the pen register statute.72 The 
government applied for an order authorizing the disclosure of historical cell site 
location information under the frequently utilized and broad reaching pen register 
statute, claiming that the location information could be collected because it could be 
considered “the contents of an electronic communication.”73 The court determined 
that the requested information was essentially a means to conduct surveillance of a 
telephone user because the requested cell site location information would reveal a 
person’s location at a specific time.74 Furthermore, authorization of the disclosure of 
the location information would essentially grant the government the ability to install 
a tracking device without the probable cause necessary for a warrant.75 However, the 
court did not consider the overarching privacy matters at stake and instead narrowly 
focused its decision on the specific application presented in the case.76 
Distinguishing the legal differences between real-time tracking and passive 
historical tracking provides the foundation for the assertion that real-time cell phone 
tracking is a Fourth Amendment search. In the same year that the connection was 
                                                
 70 Taylor Martin, The Evolution of the Smartphone, POCKETNOW (July 8, 2014),  
http://pocketnow.com/2014/07/28/the-evolution-of-the-smartphone; see also Riley v. 
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014). 
 71 Jones, supra note 7, at 226 (providing that issues also include “the type of information 
collected, governmental interest in the search, the length of surveillance, and the criminality of 
the defendant”). 
 72 In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 384 F. 
Supp. 2d 562, 563 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 73 Id. at 563-64. 
 74 Id. at 564. 
 75 Id. (noting that authorization of a pen register under the pen register statute does not 
require the government to obtain a warrant). 
 76 United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759, 770 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (citing In re 
Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 
322-23 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (reconsidering government’s application for cell site location 
information that was previously denied in In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing 
the Use of a Pen Register, 384 F. Supp. 2d 562)). 
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made between location tracking and historical cell site data,77 the court also 
considered the issue of real-time tracking via cell site location data.78 Here, the 
government sought both historical and real-time cell site location information under 
the pen register statute. The court concluded that real-time, prospective cell site data 
should be considered a tracking device under Section 3117 of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).79 Moreover, the court held that because cell 
site data should be considered a tracking device, none of the other sections of the 
ECPA, including the pen register section, would allow the government to gather 
prospective cell site location information without sufficiently meeting the probable 
cause standard.80 
The courts further extended this line of reasoning in United States v. Graham.81 
In Graham, the defendants were initially arrested and charged with firearm 
violations; however, after further investigations, the defendants were suspected to be 
involved in separate robberies.82 In order to discover the previous whereabouts of the 
defendants for the purpose of determining if they had been present at the locations of 
the robberies at the times the crimes had been committed, the government applied 
for an order to have the defendants’ cell phone providers disclose the defendants’ 
locations at the times of the robberies through cell site location information.83 After 
reviewing the factual circumstances, the court found that a very real legal distinction 
existed between historical and real-time cell site location data.84 The court 
expounded on the analysis in United States v. Maynard85 and stated that historical 
data is restricted in its scope because of its historical nature; conversely, real-time 
data provides the government with the specific movements of the suspect as they are 
                                                
 77 See In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 384 F. 
Supp. 2d at 563. 
 78 In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell-Site Location 
Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 749 (S.D. Tex. 2005). 
 79 Id. at 757; see also In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of 
Prospective Cell Site Info., 2006 WL 2871743, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73324, *17-18 (E.D. 
Wash. 2006) (stating that “real-time tracking effectively converts a cell phone into a tracking 
device[,]” and therefore, “cell site data communicated from a cell phone does not constitute an 
‘electronic (or wire) communication’ under the statute because cell site location information 
“does not involve the transfer of a human voice at any point along the path between the cell 
phone and the cell tower” it is not a “wire communication”). Section 3117 of Title 18 is titled 
“Mobile tracking devices” and defines, in subsection (b), mobile tracking devices as “an 
electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or 
object.” 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2016). 
 80 In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell-Site Location 
Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 757-59. 
 81 846 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D. Md. 2012). 
 82 Id. at 385-86. 
 83 Id. at 386. 
 84 Id. at 391. 
 85 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 
(2012). 
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occurring86 and allows the police to “discover the totality and pattern of his 
movements from place to place to place.”87 Furthermore, the court found that the 
Fourth Amendment was not implicated in the collection of historical data and that it 
likely would be implicated in a case involving real-time tracking.88 This distinction 
allowed the courts to truly distinguish, jurisprudentially, between historical and real-
time location tracking.89 However, despite the progress made by some jurisdictions 
in support of the Fourth Amendment protection of real-time cell phone tracking, 
several jurisdictions do not recognize constitutional protections for cell site and GPS 
information90 and, therefore, do not require a warrant for such collection.91 Then, 
after previous cases had laid the foundation, the issue of real-time cell phone 
tracking was finally addressed in United States v. Skinner. 
Skinner serves as a cornerstone of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in relation 
to real-time cell phone tracking; however, although the holding and rule of law 
extrapolated from Skinner remains extant, it should be construed narrowly and held 
to its specific facts. In Skinner, defendant Skinner was arrested, charged with, and 
convicted of “conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute in excess 
of 1,000 kilograms of marijuana,” among other counts.92 Through an intensive 
investigation, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents determined that Skinner was 
acting as a drug courier for a large scale drug dealer, which required Skinner to drive 
to Arizona to pick up and pay for the marijuana and then return to Tennessee to 
deliver the marijuana to James Michael West, the drug dealer.93 Authorities 
identified the specific phone numbers used for communications between Skinner and 
                                                
 86 Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 391-92. 
 87 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558; see also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). 
 88 Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 389; see also In re Application of the United States for 
Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that the Fourth Amendment is 
not implicated in the government’s collection of historical cell site data); Jones, supra note 7, 
at 224. 
 89 See In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Prospective and Continuous 
Release of Cell Site Location Records, 31 F. Supp. 3d 889, 892 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (describing 
real-time cell phone location tracking as prospective in nature, in the sense that it “seeks the 
disclosure of records created in the future, after the government’s request . . . enabling law 
enforcement to monitor the cell phone’s location contemporaneously in (or near) real time”). 
 90 United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759, 771-72 (E.D. Mich. 2013). 
 91 When a warrant, supported by probable cause, is not required for the collection of cell 
phone location information, it is because courts have ruled that cell phone location 
information falls under various statutes (including the Stored Communications Act) which 
allow for the access of information by a court order which is obtained through a showing 
requiring less than probable cause. See id. 
 92 United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 776 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 93 Id. at 775. DEA agents lawfully intercepted wire communications from phones 
subscribed to West’s name. Through the wiretap, the authorities learned that West was using a 
drug courier known as “big foot” (Skinner) who would make the trip back and forth between 
Tennessee and Arizona on West’s behalf. The identity of Skinner was not known until DEA 
agents arrested only who they knew to be “big foot” in Lubbock, Texas; additionally, Skinner 
carried out his drug courier duties with the assistance of his son, who was also arrested. Id. 
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West through the wiretap and then obtained an order authorizing the phone company 
to provide location information consisting of real-time cell site information and GPS 
location data for Skinner’s telephone number.94 For three days, DEA agents pinged 
Skinner’s phone, tracking his location in real time as he left Arizona with the 
intention to return to Tennessee.95 After tracking Skinner to Lubbock, Texas, the 
DEA agents communicated the information to the Lubbock office, which then 
effectuated an arrest.96 Skinner challenged the constitutionality of the DEA’s real-
time cell phone tracking conducted and claimed it was a violation of his reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the location information transmitted from his phone.97 
The court disagreed with Skinner and refused to accept that he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the location information from his cell phone. 98 The court 
in Skinner relied on the holding in Knotts to determine that, because Skinner was 
traveling in an automobile on a public thoroughfare, he had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements and information relating to his location.99 
Effectively, the court determined that, although the information obtained by the cell 
phone location data (including the GPS data) may have assisted in the tracking of 
Skinner, the same information could have been gathered by visual surveillance.100 
Therefore, the court in Skinner concluded the government’s collection of real-time 
location information was not a search under the Fourth Amendment because, under 
Knotts, Skinner had no reasonable expectation of privacy.101 Although Skinner held 
that the real-time collection of location information obtained through ping data of the 
defendant’s cell phone was not a search under the Fourth Amendment, it has been 
distinguished by subsequent cases and should not be followed as a general rule 
regarding the real-time, active tracking of cell phone location.102 
                                                
 94 Id. at 776. 
 95 Id. at 780. 
 96 Id. at 776. 
 97 Id. at 777. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 778; United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759, 773 (E.D. Mich. 2013); see 
also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (“[O]ne has a lesser expectation of 
privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one’s 
residence or as the repository of personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public 
scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain 
view.”). 
 100 Skinner, 690 F.3d at 778; see also Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 771-72. 
 101 Skinner, 690 F.3d at 781; Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 773. 
 102 See generally Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759; In re Application of U.S. for Order 
Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526 
(D. Md. 2011); State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2013). 
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V. LIMITING SKINNER AND ESTABLISHING A NEW BRIGHT-LINE RULE 
A. Limitations of Skinner 
The Skinner holding should not be extrapolated to anything further than its 
specific facts, as the facts and rulings constrain its application only to parallel 
instances.103 The first limitation inherently imposed on future application of Skinner 
by its facts is the duration and comprehensiveness of the collected location 
information.104 Justice Alito, in his concurring opinion in Jones, stated that there 
may be situations where police, using otherwise legal methods, comprehensively 
track an individual’s activities and location to the extent that the very 
comprehensiveness of the tracking is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.105  
If government agents regularly carry out real-time cell phone tracking via 
pinging, effectively tracking the suspect’s exact location as he travels from place to 
place, it is clearly comprehensive data collection because it is analogous to Jones. 
The conduct is arguably even more intensive than the location information that was 
obtained by the GPS device affixed to Jones’s car.106 Location information obtained 
by a GPS device attached to an automobile is strictly limited to the areas where the 
automobile is located, essentially driveways, garages, parking lots or roads.107 
Comparatively, real-time location information gathered by a cell phone provides 
location information as to wherever the cell phone is located, an essentially endless 
                                                
 103 Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, allows warrantless cell phone location tracking when “the 
government seeks to track an individual for a short period of time only, with no foreseeable 
intrusion into protected areas.”  Powell, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 780. 
 104 Skinner, 690 F.3d at 780 (stating that location information collected only for three days 
“accords with expectations of privacy”); Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 773-74. 
 105 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963-64 (2012); Skinner, 690 F.3d at 781. In 
Jones, the government tracked the suspect by attaching a GPS device to his car and 
continuously tracking his movements for a span of 28 days. The majority chose to decide the 
case based on the trespass doctrine, revitalized from Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 
457 (1928), instead of analyzing the case through a reasonable expectation of privacy (Katz) 
test. In his concurrence, Justice Alito, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, 
addressed the issue of a reasonable expectation of privacy and determined that the extreme 
comprehensiveness and length of the monitoring constituted a Fourth Amendment search. 
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 106 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor described the 
possible comprehensiveness of a search involving the location information collected by a GPS 
device attached to a suspect’s car and that, even for short-term monitoring, the 
comprehensiveness could be enough on its own to implicate the Fourth Amendment. Justice 
Sotomayor stated that “GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a 
person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familiar, political, 
professional, religious and sexual associations.” Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 107 See People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1203-04 (N.Y. 2009) (stating that data from a 
GPS device affixed to an automobile could likely disclose “trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic 
surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense 
attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay 
bar and on and on”). 
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scope of location possibilities.108 Therefore, because real-time cell phone location 
tracking is very likely to be considered comprehensive data, if the tracking is carried 
out longer than the three days the police used to track Skinner’s phone, the Fourth 
Amendment should be implicated.109 
The second limitation to Skinner is that the court utilized an inherently limiting 
rationale that would result in an inability to extend the holding to cases involving 
active, real-time location tracking via pinging. The Sixth Circuit explained, “If a tool 
used to transport contraband gives of a signal that can be tracked for location, 
certainly the police can track the signal.”110 Furthermore, according to the court, 
because the data was produced by the cell phone on its own, the access of the data 
was not an infringement on a reasonable expectation of privacy.111 Following this 
rationale limits law enforcement officers to tracking cell phones by strictly passive 
means, purely tracking the signals emitted by the cell phone.112 This rationale 
effectively overlooks all of the instances where law enforcement actually sends a 
signal to the phone in order to track it; therefore, any instance of active pinging 
would exclude the application of Skinner.113 Additionally, because the government is 
actively and purposefully accessing an individual’s cell phone via electronic 
signaling, this type of pinging would be an intrusion upon an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.114 
The third glaring limitation to Skinner is that the holding only applies to 
situations where law enforcement agents track a specific cell phone while the user of 
the phone is traveling on public thoroughfares.115 Skinner relied heavily on the 
rationale in Knotts, determining that when an individual travels on public 
thoroughfares, the police are able to track him or her through the unenhanced ability 
of visual observation.116 Because the DEA would have acquired the same data and 
results if the agency had tracked Skinner by simply following him in a car, the court 
rationalized that, just as in Knotts, the GPS-enhanced tracking did not violate any 
                                                
 108 In Knotts, the Supreme Court rationalized that if the government ever effectuated such 
comprehensive surveillance protocols, that essentially equated to a twenty-four hour continual 
surveillance and tracking, that such “dragnet-type law enforcement practices” could likely 
implicate the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983). 
 109 Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 774. 
 110 Skinner, 690 F.3d at 777. 
 111 Id. 
 112 See id. 
 113 See Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 767 (explaining that law enforcement can artificially 
speed up the process of location tracking cell phones by pinging a cell phone, “that is, sending 
an electronic signal to a target cell phone . . . that triggers an identification [and location] 
transmission from the phone”). 
 114 See In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a 
Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 583 (D. Md. 2011). 
 115 Skinner, 690 F.3d at 781; Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 774. 
 116 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284-85 (1983); Skinner, 690 F.3d at 780. 
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reasonable expectation of privacy.117 Therefore, it is inferable that if law 
enforcement tracks a phone using real-time pinging and is not categorically certain 
that the government agents perform the tracking only while the phone and phone 
user are located on public thoroughfares, the surveillance cannot be shielded from 
Fourth Amendment implications.118 
B. Real-Time Cell Phone Location Tracking Should Be Considered a 
Fourth Amendment Search Because It Infringes Upon a Person’s 
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Tracking real-time location information from cell phones should be protected by 
the Fourth Amendment because individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in their location when not on public thoroughfares, and cell phone pinging can 
disclose when an individual is in a constitutionally protected area.119 Both Powell 
and Earls followed the reasoning set forth in Karo to determine that although people 
do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their movements on public 
thoroughfares, they do have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their location 
within a private residence.120 Although a warrant is not required for tracking a 
person’s phone while the individual is on public roads, as soon as a “tracked cell 
phone signaled that it was inside a private residence (or other location protected by 
the Fourth Amendment),”121 a warrant would be absolutely necessary because 
tracking a person’s movements within his or her own private home is arguably the 
penultimate situation deserving of Fourth Amendment protection.122 
                                                
 117 Skinner, 690 F.3d at 780 (“[T]he monitoring of the location of the contraband-carrying 
vehicle as it crossed the country is no more of a comprehensively invasive search than if 
instead the car was identified in Arizona and then tracked visually and the search handed off 
from one local authority to another as the vehicles progressed. That the officers were able to 
use less expensive and more efficient means [pinging] to track the vehicles is only to their 
credit.”); see also Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284-85; United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 
(2012) (Alito. J., concurring) (stating that “relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s 
movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society has 
recognized as reasonable”). 
 118 See Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 774-75. 
 119 Id. at 775; State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2013). 
 120 Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 775; Earls, 70 A.3d at 639; United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 
705, 713 (1984). 
 121 Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 774 (first citing Karo, 468 U.S. at 712-13; then citing Kyllo 
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)). 
 122 The text of the Fourth Amendment specifically states that “[t]he right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. “At the very core of the Fourth 
Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from 
unreasonable governmental intrusion.” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 (citing Silverman v. United 
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). It can be argued that the very basis for the Fourth 
Amendment arose out of the need to protect a person’s home from warrantless searches that 
essentially equated to a government sponsored home invasion masquerading as an 
inspection. See Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807. “At the risk of belaboring the 
obvious, private residences are places in which the individual normally expects privacy free 
 
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
92 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:75 
 
Following the plain text of the Fourth Amendment, a serious problem arises in 
virtually every search involving real-time cell phone location tracking that is not 
held exclusively to public roads. The widespread use of modern cell phones, which 
are essentially an “indispensable part of modern life,” creates an issue where the 
“historical distinction between public and private areas” are blurred because cell 
phones can emit signals from both places.123 Under “virtually any circumstance,” it 
would be impossible for law enforcement officers to know in advance whether or not 
the prospective real-time cell site location data (or GPS data) collected “would come 
from a protected area.”124 
Cell site location data and GPS data, both the tools of real-time cell phone 
location tracking, would allow law enforcement agents to extend its tracking into 
private residences where the expectation of privacy is unassailable.125 Information 
disclosing the cell phone’s location inside of a private residence is information that 
only otherwise could be obtained through a physical search of the residence; in other 
words, “a police officer would have to, in some manner, enter the premises [and 
conduct a search of the premises] to obtain the information generated by the cell 
phone.”126 A search in terms of the Fourth Amendment “occurs when an expectation 
of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.”127 Private 
residences are places undeniably protected by a reasonable expectation of privacy 
and, thus, the Fourth Amendment.128 Therefore, considering the comprehensive 
nature of cell phone location tracking, tracking cell phone location in real time 
(CSLI and GPS) into private residences is an infringement on a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and a search under the Fourth Amendment.129 
                                                
of governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one 
that society is prepared to recognize as justifiable.” Karo, 468 U.S. at 714.  
 123 Earls, 70 A.3d at 652; see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014) 
(stating, famously, “[C]ell phones . . . are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life 
that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human 
anatomy”). 
 124 Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 776; see also Karo, 468 U.S. at 718 (“[Law enforcement 
officers] have no way of knowing in advance whether the beeper will be transmitting its signals 
from inside private premises.”); In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure 
of Location Info. of a Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 543 (D. Md. 2011) (“[I]t 
is highly unlikely—indeed almost unimaginable—that a cell phone would remain within 
public spaces.”); Earls, 70 A.3d at 652 (“[L]aw enforcement had no way of knowing in 
advance whether defendant’s cell phone was being monitored in a . . . private space.”). Cf. 
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38-39 (determining that barring only the thermal imaging of “intimate 
details” to be impracticable because law enforcement agents couldn’t know in advance what 
through-the-wall surveillance would detect). 
 125 See Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 774-75. 
 126 Id. at 775. 
 127 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
 128 Karo, 468 U.S. at 714. 
 129 See In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a 
Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d at 538. 
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It is crucial to fully appreciate that the real-time tracking of a cell phone not only 
can provide the location of the individual carrying the phone, but also indisputably 
tracks the location of the cell phone itself. In most examples of legal analysis dealing 
with the issue of real-time tracking under the Fourth Amendment, courts restrict their 
engagement of the issue to whether the real-time tracking intrudes on the phone 
possessor’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her location.130 However, 
there has been virtually no analysis on whether real-time location tracking violates 
an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the location of his or her own 
cell phone, which is not held out in public view.  
The Fourth Amendment should protect an individual’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the location of his or her cell phone. The plain text of the Fourth 
Amendment provides, in part, that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their . . . 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]”131The 
Supreme Court has previously established that cell phones are items that qualify for 
the protection of the Fourth Amendment.132 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held 
on countless occasions that, absent a showing of probable cause, the only way a law 
enforcement officer can conduct a physical search or frisk of a person133 is if the law 
enforcement officer believes, to a degree of reasonable articulable suspicion, the 
individual is carrying a weapon (for officer safety).134 In almost every instance, 
individuals will keep and carry cell phones in locations that are shielded from the 
plain view of a law enforcement officer, such as pockets or purses. Therefore, when 
law enforcement officers actively ping and track an individual’s cell phone that 
happens to be located on his or her person, such as in a pocket or a bag, law 
                                                
 130 See generally United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012); Powell, 943 F. 
Supp. 2d 759; In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. 
of a Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526; State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 
2013). 
 131 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Additionally, it is clear that “effects,” in terms of the Fourth 
Amendment, is considered to be personal property. Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: Police 
and Cellphone Privacy, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 25, 2014), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/04/argument-preview-police-and-cellphone-privacy/. 
 132 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014). 
 133 There are several exceptions to the search warrant requirement (search incident to a 
lawful arrest, plain view, automobile exception, consent, exigent circumstances, and special 
needs). It is foreseeable that the only exceptions that could apply to a real-time cell phone 
tracking situation would be the plain view exception, if the police happened to be tracking a 
person’s phone as they carried their phone out in plain view, and the exigent circumstances 
exception, for situations where police need to track a cell phone for an emergency situation. 
The thought that law enforcement would try to actively track a cell phone only when it was 
displayed in plain view is extremely unlikely, but would be arguable if it could be proved that 
they strictly abided by the guidelines of the plain view doctrine. Tracking of cell phones for 
emergency circumstances (under exigent circumstances) is generally allowable but is an 
entirely different issue in itself that will not be addressed in this note. See Arizona v. Hicks, 
480 U.S. 321 (1987) (announcing the plain view doctrine); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 
392 (1978) (exploring exigent circumstances). 
 134 See, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269-70 (2000); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 
U.S. 366, 374, 376 (1993); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 20-21, 24 (1968). 
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enforcement has effectively conducted an unconstitutional Fourth Amendment 
search of the individual’s person135 to determine that the person is, in fact, carrying a 
cell phone.136  
People do not purchase cell phones to be utilized as tracking devices against their 
interests, and this expectation that the government will not commandeer a person’s 
cell phone to track their every movement is a reasonable expectation. For a brief and 
final argument, for the sake of a Fourth Amendment analysis, note the seminal case 
of Katz and, more specifically, Justice Harlan’s immensely influential concurring 
opinion. In terms of Fourth Amendment analysis, Justice Harlan determined that 
there was twofold test: “first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”137 Considering real-time cell phone location 
tracking, it is understood and accepted that people do not buy cell phones to serve as 
tracking devices for the police to utilize, nor do people reasonably expect the 
government to hijack their cell phones to use in that manner.138  
People purchase and use cell phones to communicate with others and to access 
the Internet and the myriad applications available to cell phone users, not to share 
their location information with the police.139 Cell phone users may be aware that 
their phones have the capability to transfer and generate location information 
through the general course of phone usage, but most people are entirely unaware of 
the extent of modern tracking capabilities and “reasonably do not expect law 
enforcement to convert their phones into precise, possibly continuous tracking 
tools.”140 Therefore, real-time cell phone tracking through CSLI and GPS data is an 
infringement on a reasonable expectation of privacy and constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment search. In addition to real-time cell phone tracking infringing on a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, there is also a strong argument that real-time cell 
phone tracking implicates the Fourth Amendment through the application of the 
trespass doctrine. 
C. Real-Time Cell Phone Location Tracking is a Fourth Amendment 
Search Under the Jones Trespass Doctrine Because Government 
Pinging Private Cell Phones Constitutes a Trespass to Chattels 
The Supreme Court in Jones found the extensive GPS tracking of Jones’s car to 
be a Fourth Amendment search, not because it violated the defendant’s reasonable 
                                                
 135 Even the crime prevention tactic of stop-and-frisk is strictly based on a police officer 
having a reasonable suspicion that the person to be stopped and frisked is armed and 
dangerous. David Rudovsky & Lawrence Rosenthal, The Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk in 
New York City, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 117 (2013), 
https://www.pennlawreview.com/online/162-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-117.pdf.  
 136 See cases cited supra note 130 (arguing that, without applicable exceptions, the search 
of a person without a warrant is unconstitutional).  
 137 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1976) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 138 State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 634-39 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2013). 
 139 Id. at 643, 652-53; see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484-85 (2014) 
(describing, in both cases, the indispensable nature of cell phones in modern life). 
 140 Earls, 70 A.3d at 651-52. 
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expectation of privacy, but because the government’s conduct constituted a 
trespass.141 The Court elaborated that a trespass itself is not sufficient for a Fourth 
Amendment search; rather, there must be a trespass that is conjoined with “an 
attempt to find something or to obtain information.”142 However, the issue at hand in 
Jones was not analogous to the issue of real-time cell phone tracking; therefore, the 
Court did not address the extent of the applicability of the trespass doctrine.143 
Skinner did not truly entertain the applicability of the Jones trespass doctrine to 
the issue of real-time cell phone tracking, but the Court’s rationale portrayed a belief 
that the data accessing process was too passive to be considered a trespass.144 The 
Skinner Court erred in its understanding and explanation of the process of real-time 
tracking.145  The result was a failure both to realize the active nature of the process 
and to entertain the issue that the government’s active electronic interference with an 
individual’s cell phone may be a trespass to chattels, thereby triggering an analysis 
under the trespass doctrine.146 
Lower courts have, on several occasions, held that electronic signals are 
sufficient contact to constitute trespass to chattels.147  Trespass of chattels has been 
defined to include the “using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of 
another.”148 The comments to the Restatement tend to confine the tort to instances of 
physical contact; however, in instances of electronic signals, courts have found that 
physical contact is not necessary if some harm can be proved.149 Active signaling by 
                                                
 141 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951-53 (2012). 
 142 Id. at 951 n.5. 
 143 The court maintained that instances of government surveillance involving strictly the 
transmission of electronic signals and not including any trespass would still be subject to 
a Katz analysis. The Court stressed that the trespass doctrine was not replacing the Katz test; it 
would strictly be a supplementary tool for Fourth Amendment search analysis. Id. at 953. 
 144 See Case Comment, Sixth Circuit Holds that “Pinging” a Target’s Cell Phone to Obtain 
GPS Data is Not a Search Subject to the Warrant Requirement—United States v. 
Skinner, 126 HARV. L. REV. 802, 806 (2013) (citing United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 
776 (6th Cir. 2012)). 
 145 Id. at 806-07. Furthermore, the section of this article explaining the technological 
approach for attaining real-time cell phone location information demonstrates the active 
nature of real-time tracking. The Skinner court grossly misrepresented the invasive process 
utilized to attain this private and personal information. See id. at 804-06. 
 146 See id. 
 147 See id. at 808. Justice Alito’s concurrence explicitly raised the relevant question: 
“Would the sending of a radio signal to activate [a GPS] system constitute a trespass to 
chattels?” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962. He then pointed out that lower courts have previously 
held that electronic signaling has been sufficient to find a trespass to chattels. Id. 
 148 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 149 Case Comment, supra note 144, at 807 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 
cmt. e, § 218(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2016)). Also worth noting is that there may be instances 
where “the intermeddling is actionable even though the physical condition of the chattel is not 
impaired.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2016). See also 
Case Comment, supra note 144, at 807, stating: 
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law enforcement would cause an individual’s phone to do something out of the 
ordinary and impair the value of the phone in several ways, “including the use of 
more battery power and a decrease in [a] disposable phone’s intended ability to 
confer greater privacy on the user,” among others.150 The detrimental effects of 
active signaling would be sufficient for a showing of harm to the chattel to satisfy a 
finding of trespass.151 Furthermore, the courts have exhibited a willingness to 
entertain the ever-evolving state of technology and its application to trespass to 
chattels to find more ways in which non-physical interferences can constitute a 
trespass.152 Although Jones did not directly address the trespass implication of 
electronic signaling and Skinner decided not to apply the doctrine, if a court 
addressed the issue of real-time cell phone tracking as the active and invasive 
process it is, it would likely find a trespass to chattels and a Fourth Amendment 
search under the Jones trespass doctrine.153 Finally, in instances where law 
enforcement uses special technology to conduct real-time cell phone tracking, there 
is an additional justification that courts should utilize in order to rationalize the 
implication of the Fourth Amendment. 
D. Real-Time Cell Phone Location Tracking by Cell Site Simulator 
Devices Should Be Considered a Fourth Amendment Search 
Because It Violates the Reliance on Technology Established in 
Kyllo 
In Kyllo, the Supreme Court held that the government’s use of a thermal imaging 
device to develop heat images of the inside of a home constituted a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.154 To investigate a marijuana growing operation without 
                                                
In CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997), a 
federal district court noted that “trespass to chattels has evolved from its original 
common law application . . . to include the unauthorized use of personal property.” 
Citing cases that had deemed electronic signals to be sufficiently physically tangible, 
the court held that bulk spam emails sent to the plaintiff's servers caused sufficient 
harm (in the form of decreased bandwidth and goodwill toward the plaintiff's 
company) to sustain an action for trespass to chattels. In a later case, the same district 
court found that the decrease in a server's value as a safe location for files following 
the defendant's unauthorized access was also sufficient. Similarly, the Second Circuit 
enjoined a company from installing automatic software updates that, if allowed, could 
crash plaintiff's computers. Likewise, a federal district court in Illinois held that a 
defendant's unauthorized spyware installation on the plaintiff's computer created 
harms such as depleted memory, increased energy and bandwidth usage, elevated 
internet use charges, domination of on-screen pixels, and increased user frustration, 
thus supporting a cause of action for trespass to chattels. 
 150 Case Comment, supra note 144, at 807-08. 
 151 See id. 
 152 See generally John D. Saba, Jr., Comment, Internet Property Rights: E-Trespass, 33 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 367 (2002). 
 153 See generally id.; Case Comment, supra note 144; United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
945 (2012); United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 154 533 U.S. 27, 29-30, 34 (2001). 
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entering a private home, law enforcement used a thermal imaging device to scan the 
home from the exterior and develop heat images of its interior.155 Through the 
emitted heat signatures, law enforcement officers determined that the homeowners 
were using halide lights to facilitate marijuana growth.156 In its decision, the Court 
reasoned that using sense-enhancing technology to obtain information relating to the 
inside of a home, which is information that could not have been otherwise gained 
without a “physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, constitutes a 
search—at least where the technology in question is not in general public use.”157 
Considering that it is practically impossible for law enforcement officers to know in 
advance whether or not the prospective real-time cell site location data (or GPS data) 
collected would come from within a home, it is appropriate to subject the tracking 
technology to a Kyllo analysis.158  
In many cases, law enforcement utilizes technology known as cell site 
simulators; these simulators give off signals to deceive cell phones into believing 
that the device is a cell tower so that the cell phone will transmit its location to the 
simulator.159 Cell site simulators work in different ways depending on the specific 
device being used; two commonly used devices are the TriggerFish and the 
StingRay.160  A TriggerFish can intercept a cell phone’s information, as well as 
verbal content of a phone conversation, but the interception can only come from 
active cell phones as they make calls and actively transmit.161 StingRays are devices 
that can capture cell phone information by actively “forcing” the phone to transmit 
its information by emitting signals that trick cell phones into treating the simulator as 
if it were a real cell tower.162 Information collected by either cell site simulator 
device can effectively be used by law enforcement to triangulate and locate a 
specific cell phone to a “narrow geographical location.”163 These invasive devices 
are not utilized by or available to the general public.164 
                                                
 155 Id. at 29-30. 
 156 Id.  
 157 Id. at 34; see also In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of 
Location Info. of a Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 539 (D. Md. 2011) (“The 
Supreme Court has maintained a distinction between areas where a person can be publicly 
viewed and areas that could not be observed ‘from the outside’ using traditional investigatory 
techniques.”). 
 158 United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759, 776 (E.D. Mich. 2013); see also In re 
Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a Specified 
Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d at 540 (stating that the government “runs afoul” when it uses 
enhanced surveillance technology, not available to the public, to search private areas). 
 159 Brian L. Owsley, TriggerFish, StingRays, and Fourth Amendment Fishing Expeditions, 
66 HASTINGS L.J. 183, 185 (2014). 
 160 Id. at 191. 
 161 Id.   
 162 Id. at 191-92. 
 163 Id. at 193. 
 164 Id. at 191-93. 
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The primary manufacturer of cell site simulators is the Harris Corporation, which 
sells the simulator devices to state and federal law enforcement agencies.165 
Furthermore, the Harris Corporation sells its cell site simulators to the government 
“from a catalogue that it conceals from the public on national security grounds,” 
doesn’t disclose the devices on its website, and warns that usage of the devices 
outside law enforcement purposes could be a criminal offense, punishable by a term 
of five years in jail.166 In fact, one of the only ways an individual can access a device 
for personal use is to buy high-tech computer equipment and construct a homemade 
cell site simulator device.167 The device cannot be considered to be in general public 
use if the manufacturers of the devices refuse to sell to members of the general 
public.168  
The use of cell site simulator devices in real-time cell phone tracking is 
analogous to the use of the thermal imagining device in Kyllo. Just as the 
government used a thermal imaging device to “look into” Kyllo’s home, the 
government’s use of cell site simulators will effectively “look into” the phone 
possessor’s home if the targeted cell phone is inside the home.169 Similarly, as the 
thermal imaging device used in Kyllo was not a device available to the general 
public, cell site simulators used in real-time cell phone tracking are also not available 
to the general public.170 Therefore, considering that it is a practical impossibility for 
law enforcement to know in advance whether or not real-time cell phone data will 
come from within a private, constitutionally protected residence when law 
enforcement utilizes a cell site simulator device that is clearly not available to the 
general public, the government effectuates a Fourth Amendment search.171 
                                                
 165 Id. at 185; Ryan Gallagher, Meet the Machines that Steal Your Phone’s Data, ARS 
TECHNICA (Sept. 25, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/09/meet-the-machines-
that-steal-your-phones-data/. Oakland County, in Michigan, has recently received a state grant 
to purchase a newer, higher powered, cell site simulator, also manufactured by Harris 
Corporation. This device, called a Hailstorm, is significantly more powerful than a StingRay 
and has previously been used the United States military in anti-terrorism efforts. The Oakland 
County Sheriff’s Office is one of about two dozen forces that utilize this device. The 
Hailstorm is such a covertly utilized device that “even national experts will only speculate 
about its capabilities.” Joel Kurth & Lauren Abdel-Razzaq, Military Device Sweeps Activity in 
Wide Area, DEMOCRATIC UNDERGROUND (Apr. 5, 2014), 
http://www.democraticunderground.com/10024787166. 
 166 Gallagher, supra note 165. Harris Corporation cell simulator devices are “developed for 
military and spy agencies and information about them is on ‘bureaucratic lockdown’ because 
the manufacturer, Harris, claims specifications are a ‘trade secret.’” Kurth & Abdel-Razzaq, 
supra note 165.  
 167 See Owsley, supra note 159, at 191. A cell site simulator could be constructed by a 
bright “computer whiz” with about $1,500 worth of equipment. Id. 
 168 See Gallagher, supra note 165. 
 169 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-30, 34 (2001); United States v. Powell, 943 
F. Supp. 2d 759, 776 (E.D. Mich. 2013). 
 170 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34; Owsley, supra note 159, at 191. 
 171 See Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 776; United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 (1984) 
(stating that [law enforcement officers] have “no way of knowing in advance whether the 
beeper will be transmitting its signals from inside private premises”); In re Application of 
U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a Specified Wireless Tel., 849 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Developments in technology will continue to influence all facets of life, 
including criminal law and the way law enforcement will attempt to protect social 
order. However, as technology allows law enforcement to increasingly invade the 
privacy of U.S. citizens, imposed limitations on the pervasiveness of the 
government’s reach are imperative to the protection of individual liberty and 
privacy.  
Real-time cell phone location tracking should be a Fourth Amendment search as 
a bright-line rule. Real-time cell phone tracking violates a person’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy in both his or her physical location within constitutionally 
protected areas, such as homes, and in the location of the cell phone itself when held 
in pockets or containers not in open view of the general public. Furthermore, 
individuals do not purchase cell phones with the expectation that the government 
will hijack the cell phone and use it as a tracking device, evidencing a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. Real-time cell phone tracking constitutes a trespass to 
chattels and thereby implicates the once defunct trespass doctrine revitalized in 
Jones. Finally, the use of cell site simulators in conducting real-time cell phone 
tracking equates to the use of technology, not available to the general public, to 
facilitate a search, which is conduct that Kyllo held unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment. To continue to uphold the Fourth Amendment and truly protect the 
people from unreasonable searches, the Fourth Amendment must apply to the highly 
invasive and comprehensive government conduct that is real-time cell phone 
location tracking.  
  
                                                
F. Supp. 2d 526, 539 (D. Md. 2011) (stating that “it is highly unlikely – indeed almost 
unimaginable – that a cell phone would remain within public spaces”); State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 
630, 652 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2013) (“Law enforcement had no way of knowing in advance whether 
defendant’s cell phone was being monitored in a . . . private space.”); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38-
39. Under the Kyllo standard, any searches of private residences conducted by technology not 
available to the general public that could not otherwise have been conducted without a warrant 
are unconstitutional. See id. The use of cell site simulators is patently exclusive to government 
law enforcement and should violate the Kyllo standard every time they are used to track cell 
phone location information in real-time. See id. 
25Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
100 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:75 
 
 
26https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss1/9
